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In this paper, we introduce an electricity market model and use it to explore the effect of climate 
change on electricity output and prices. It is calibrated to the New Zealand Electricity Market, 
and includes multiple generation fuels, uncertain fuel availability, and storage options.  The 
model is formulated in continuous time, which mimics the many short trading periods that are 
common to electricity spot markets, while properly incorporating forward-looking generation 
decision making. Specifically, it is used to estimate the effects of changes that may arise in 
characteristics of fuels -water and gas- as a consequence of climate change and climate change 
policies.  The model does this under the polar cases of a competitive market structure and 
monopoly. There are three key findings from the results.  First, the results illustrate the 
importance of allowing for volatility and including management of storage in electricity market 
models.  Second, they suggest that reductions in average hydro fuel availability will reduce 
welfare significantly. Increases in the volatility of hydro fuel availability will also affect welfare, 
but to a very small extent. Third, the value of reservoir expansion is sensitive to the distribution 
of hydro fuel availability. Finally, the effects of a carbon tax are also reported. 
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options, climate change 1. Introduction
Many volatile factors inﬂuence the performance of infrastructure and these
yield uncertainty about their presence and eﬀects when forward-looking deci-
sions are being taken about infrastructure. This paper is restricted to consid-
eration of physiscal infrastructure which has a wide spectrum of such factors.
It includes physical events such as earthquakes that are beyond the inﬂuence of
human-kind, other events for which there is a very small probability of occur-
rence and events that will almost certainly occur at some point in any reasonable
period of time. It also includes economic events relating to uncommon ﬁnan-
cial episodes and common, but uncertain, volatility in demand and cost. Rare
physical events have implications for investment in infrastructure that provide
some mitigation of the eﬀects the eﬀects of these events.1 In so doing, there
is a trade-oﬀ between providing in advance for remotely likely but substantial
events in speciﬁc, and usually costly, redundancy infrastructure, and having an
economy with the resources to deal ex post with natural disasters. Obviously,
some intermediate position will be socially desirable.
This paper considers investment in infrastructure taking into account more
immediate risks. It argues that demand should be be responsive to infrastruc-
ture direct and indirect costs and risks; and that where economically feasible
pricing2, will facilitate managing these risks and so enable a desirable level of
investment in infrastructure. Much infrastructure - e.g. roads, electricity and
gas transmission, broadband and telecommunications networks - provide plat-
forms on which consumers interact in various ways that aﬀect the utilisation of
the platform. Without consumers revealing their willingness to pay for these
platforms investment in it is unlikely to meet the test of being socially desir-
able. This issue is placed in perspective below by consideration of the eﬀect of
incentive regulation on investment.
Infrastructure investment once made is sunk - i.e. not recoverable in nearly
its entirety - and typically entails economies of scale in investment: even in
infrastructure maintenance expenditure. 3 These features and uncertainty in
demand mean that provision of infrastructure is investment in capacity rather
than in demand per se. When combined with volatility they complicate the
evaluation of infrastructure investment.
2. Volatility and Economies of Scale
There is volatility in both demand and cost, and the extent of it is aﬀected
by the nature of the industry. Technological change aﬀects cost and demand
1This issue is discussed by Andrew King in this volume.
2Indirect costs include costs imposed by individuals that aﬀects others. These suggest
prices such as congestion prices that enable consumers of infrastructure to express their de-
mand for it while paying the cost of externalities induced by their use of the infrastructure.
3Economies of scale in investment mean that the larger the quantum of investment the
lower the cost per unit of service or output of the additional capacity.
1Table 1: Variability of Infrastructure Construction Costs
Variation UnderGround Transformer 11kV Urban
Coeﬃcient of 17.8% 40.1% 27.8%
and where it is rapid - as in telecommunications - its eﬀects can be signiﬁcant.
Demand volatility and hence risk arises where there is competition in modes
of delivery - e.g. as between road and rail, and for gas pipelines as between al-
ternative fuels and locations of customers. Figure 1 shows the eﬀect of economic
activity (demand) on the utilisation of gas pipelines. It reports capacity and
usage of diﬀerent pipelines at diﬀerent points (gate stations) and it illustrates
that volatility in demand can be very substantial. Evaluating investment in
capacity requires assessing and taking account of such variability.
Figure 1
Cost uncertainty arises due to variation in technological change, and a range
of other factors. PBA (2004) report that cost variation can be attributed to: the
price of inputs such as labour and materials, the level of competition; the level of
supply and demand, project size and location, legal and regulatory requirements,
constraints imposed by local authorities, between new construction sites and
established locations, design and construction standards; and the eﬃciency of
the project and contract management. While cost uncertainty is reduced as a
project becomes more speciﬁc - e.g. in location and design - much may remain.
An analysis of tenders for thirty roading projects in Auckland, Christchurch
and Wellington as reported by Transit NZ (2006) suggests that on average the
range of tenders for the same project was 26% of the maximum tender. Price
Waterhouse Cooper (PWC (2004)) report on project quotes for four categories
of investments across six electricity lines companies.
The results reported in Table 1 indicate a very substantial variation in poten-
2Figure 2: Economies of Scale in Investment
Figure 3: Demand, Capacity and Scale Economies
tial construction costs.4 By way of illustration, if the quotes were normally
distributed a lines company contemplating an urban 11kV project would be of
the order of 95% certain that the spread of quotes would be 55% - 155% of
the average quote received. Variation, and thus prospective risk, is reduced by
negotiation as the project is ﬁnalsed but risk remains.5
Economies of scale in investment arise where the larger the capacity pro-
vided by the investment the lower the per-unit cost of the extra capacity. It
is illustrated in Figure 2, where economies of scale are 10% - i.e. 0.9 units of
investment are required to produce 1 unit of capacity: constant economies of
scale in investment would be where investment was 1 for 1 with capacity. In
Figure 2, investment in two steps obviously has a higher investment cost than
investment in a single step.
The conjunction of volatility and investment economies of scale complicates
infrastructure investment decisions. On the one hand a large increment in ca-
pacity will yield lower construction costs per unit of capacity than will a multi-
stage investment. On the other hand with uncertain demand growth, there
may inadequate demand for the larger capacity. Typically capacity is expanded
iteratively trading-oﬀ these two factors: where demand is more uncertain the
higher is likelihood of the smaller increment in capacity being socially desirable;
despite its higher costs. Figure 3 indicates the decision rule in the case of volatile
demand, and 10% economies of scale in infrastructure investment.
4The Coeﬃcient of Variation is the Standard Deviation of the quotes for the same project
divided by the average quote for that project.
5The risk may well be shared between the investor and the construction company.
3In Figure 3 demand and capacity are on the vertical axis and time on the
horizontal. Demand (x) is volatile and must be served, and capacity (s) is irre-
versible (sunk) but declines without investment at a ﬁxed rate of depreciation.
The socially optimal decision rule is to invest whenever demand equals capacity
and at that time increase capacity beyond the amount required to meet imme-
diate demand. This decision rule is a consequence of the presence of investment
economies of scale (see Evans and Guthrie (2006)), and it is aﬀected by the
variability in demand.6Building an extra unit of excess capacity allows the ﬁrm
to connect new customers in the future without investing (at higher cost), but
it destroys the option to wait and assess if such customers will arrive.
3. Project Evaluation and Regulation
The conﬂagration of risk, and irreversible investment materially aﬀect in-
vestment decision making (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Guthrie (2009)).
The key eﬀect is to render it socially - and for individual ﬁrms7 - desirable that
the variation in demand and cost be a critical element in the investment de-
cision. In particular, investments that seek to maximise the expected present
value of the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surpluses into the forseeable
future should consider the timing of the investment, not just whether if car-
ried out it will be socially beneﬁcial at the date of evaluation. In situations
of risk and irreversible investment it is generally desirable that there is some
delay beyond this date. The delay enables some resolution of uncertainty. If
the investment climate improves, much less is lost by delay than would be lost
by immediately (irreversibly) investing and the investment turning out to be
bad because demand (costs) turns out to be low (high). The larger the risk -
or varation of demand and cost - the larger the private and social beneﬁt of
the option to delay. Economies of scale may induce a longer waiting period to
invest because increased surety of demand increases the sensibility of building a
larger expansion in capacity and thereby gain the cost advantages of economies
of scale in investment.
The interaction among risk, irreversible investment with economies of scale
has been the achillies heel of incentive regulation of infrastructure assets. It is
useful to consider why this is so because it foretells the sorts of institutional
arrangements that facilitate socially desirable investment in infrastructure. In
New Zealand and in some other countries8 it was proposed that such infrastruc-
tures as transmission, pipelines and telecommunications be subjected to incen-
tive regulation in which the regulated price be set at a level that ﬁnancially just
supported the most eﬃcient ﬁrm in its of delivery of services, independently of
6And variability in cost, where this exists.
7Although some ﬁrms’ decisions may diﬀer from those preferred by society.
8In a number of countries it has been applied to calculating access prices for telecommuni-
cations services - see for example, the widely used forward looking cost concpt of total service
long run incremental cost (TSLRIC) . In New Zealand this regulation was proposed for lines
companies by the Commerce Commission but never actually implemented.
4the actions of the ﬁrm being regulated. The eﬃcient price to be calculated as a
price that would just enable a hypothetical, eﬃcient ﬁrm to exist and provide
existing services. The eﬀect of this on ﬁrms’ decisionmaking is illustrated by
exmining its eﬀect on the valuation of the infrastructure ﬁrm.
A ﬁrm looking forward from some date t has a valuation given by
Value(t) = Expected Present Value of Revenue less Expected Present Value of
Costs
The expected present value of costs contains the sunk cost, K(t), representing
the cost of the capacity in existence at date t, as well as expected future in-
vestment in the network. Consider the eﬀect of this incentive regulation price
setting where demand has to be served, there is 10% investment economies of
scale and uncertainty about future costs and demand: both sources of uncer-
tainty are reﬂected in the valuation of the ﬁrm that owns the infrastructure.
The valuation makes some allowance for economic uncertainty in the level of its
constant discount rate but it does not include uncertainty about large natural
disasters. In this setting, Evans and Guthrie (2006) depict a ﬁrm that has ex-
isting capacity of 100 units and an associated rate base of K(t), and a regulator
setting allowed revenue for the infrastructure provider as follows:
 Case I: just suﬃcient revenue for the ﬁrm to keep operating but not to start
up: this requires setting revenue to cover the expected cost of additional
investment but it disallows accumulated past investment (K(t));
 Case II: just suﬃcient revenue for the ﬁrm to startup and keep operating
 Case III: just suﬃcient revenue for the ﬁrm to startup, keep operating and
not lose value when it expands capacity.
Each of these cases is depicted in Figure 4
with demand on the horizontal axis depicted as moving from 0 to an existing
capacity of 100. Also depicted in Figure 4 is the optimised replacement cost
(ORC) of the capacity for each point of demand.9
In Figure 4 the value of the ﬁrm relative to the ORC line gives the value of the
ﬁrm relative to its replacement cost at each level of demand up to capacity. The
Case I ﬁrm is just willing to operate using its existing assets, that is, those put in
place in the past and depreciated. Because it is earning no return on its existing
assets the revenue it receives just covers its expected capacity expansion cost. At
low demand it makes little proﬁt and hence has a low valuation at that level of
demand. But the proﬁt increases as demand increases until the point where the
ﬁrm’s anticipation of the cost of investing in expanded capacity outweighs the
revenues per unit of demand. As demand approaches capacity the probability of
having to invest in expanded capacity increases to the point that the expected
9The optimised replacement cost (ORC) is the least cost at which demand can be served.
















































6cost outweighs the revenue allowed per unit of demand. Thus, the value of the
ﬁrm declines: by enabling the ﬁrm to just cover expected investment cost the
value of the ﬁrm at demand equals capacity is zero. This is the explanation for
the curved valuation shapes of all the cases of Figure 4. The Case I ﬁrm would
never start up for its value lies below its replacement cost: this situation arises
where existing assets are not allowed to, or cannot, earn a competitive rate
of return. Furthermore the decline in value at higher levels of demand means
that the ﬁrm is contemplating investment in capacity that will have a negative
pay-oﬀ to it.
In Case II the ﬁrm is allowed just enough revenue for it to startup and
continue operating. It is as for Case I, but with a minimal revenue stream
covering both existing assets and additional, but prospective, investment. This
ﬁrm will have a valuation greater than its replacement cost at moderate levels
of demand, but it will try to avoid investment in additional capacity. This
is shown by the fact that as demand approaches capacity the ﬁrm’s valuation
falls, and falls below its replacement cost (ORC). The revenue assigned this
ﬁrm is insuﬃcient for it to invest and maintain its value. The reason for this
result is that revenue will be reset as the revenue required to just support a
hypothetical eﬃcient ﬁrm that produces the same services (demand) as the
ﬁrm in Case II. This revenue will be based upon the cost of building a single
network and hence will be lower than that required to just support a ﬁrm that
makes incremental decisions over time; because of the presence of economies of
scale. One additional case in Figure 4 relates to a situation where there are no
economies of scale; but rather constant returns to scale. In this case the ﬁrm
does not lose value by expanding network capacity and thus has the incentive to
invest in new capacity as required. Comparison of this case and Case II shows
why incentive regulation fails in the case of economies of scale in investment:
scale economies must produce a conﬂict between the regulator and the ﬁrm in
which the ﬁrm seeks to inhibit investment.
In Case III the ﬁrm has suﬃcient revenue that its valuation does not decline
as demand approaches capacity. Evans and Guthrie op cit, explain that this can
only be achieved in the presence of investment economies of scale if the ﬁrm is
allowed an inordinately large return on its assets: a return that would not be
contemplated by a regulator. It is for this reason that pure incentive regulation
fails where there are economies of scale in investment. These economies exist
for most infrastructure and hence pure incentive regulation is unsuitable for it.
This sort of regulation has been replaced by historical cost regulation where
approved infrastructure investment projects are included as capital in the rate
base.
4. Demand And Investment
Cases II and III illustrate that where demand must be satisﬁed at prices
that approach the cost of infrastructure services it will be a challenge to achieve
the socially desirable level of investment where there are investment economies
of scale. If price is set at a level that just covers the cost of a relacement ﬁrm
7society will have to subsidise the infrastructure provider to achieve the desirable
level of investment.10 If it sets a price that just covers the incremental costs the
ﬁrm incurs with its sequence of investments it will no longer be incentive reg-
ulation: it will be approved investment management. In this situation demand
management becomes as important as investment management. In Case II the
ﬁrm’s conﬂict with the regulator might be resolved by allowing excess demand
to reach some level before investment takes place, even in the presence of in-
vestment scale economies. Indeed, this has been an approach long advocated
by some.11 The income generated by the jump in number of customers using
the infrastructure at the time of investment enables the ﬁrm to not lose value
at the time it invests. Whether, this means that the ﬁrm invests at the socially
desirable time will be aﬀected by whether it has competition or is subjected to
regulation that precludes its making excessive rents from congestion.
However, excess demand requiries prioritisation of use of the capacity. This
may be achieved by pricing where it is economic, or by congestion broadly
conceived.12 Congestion pricing for infrastructure importantly allocates the
capacity to those that most value its use, and it provides information about the
willingness to pay for an expansion in infrastructure. Both features are highly
desirable if investment in infrastructure is to be at a socially desirable level.
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